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Nicaragua v. United States: Pre-Seisin Reciprocity and
the Race to The Hague
I. INTRODUCrION
On April 9, 1984, the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the Nether-
lands filed in the Registry of the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) an application
instituting proceedings against the United States of America in respect of a dispute
concerning responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua.' Nicaragua asserted that declarations made by the parties accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2,2 of the
Statute of the Court,-a declaration made by the United States of America on August
14, 1946, 3 and a declaration made by the Republic of Nicaragua on September 29,
1929, 4 recognizing the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Interna-
1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 395
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
2. S. RosssiE, DocumENTs ON THE INTERNATONAL COURT OF JusncE 77 (2d ed. 1979). Nicaragua also relied on
paragraph 5 of Article 36 of the Statute of the present Court, which provides:
Declarations made under Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and which are
still in force shall be deemed, as between the parties to the present Statute, to be acceptances of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the period which they still have to run and in accordance
with their terms.
3. Id. at 415. The U.S. declaration provides:
I, Harry S. Truman, President of the United States of America, declare on behalf of the United States of
America, under Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and in accordance
with the Resolution of August 2, 1946, of the Senate of the United States of America (two-thirds of the Senators
present concurring therein), that the United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipsofacto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising concerning
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation;
Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already
in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States
of America as determined by the United States of America; or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (I) all the Parties to the treaty affected by the decision
are also Parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdiction;
and
Provided.further, that this declaration shall remain in force for a period of five years and thereafter until
the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this declaration.
Done at Washington this fourteenth day of August 1946.
(signed)
Harry S. Truman
4. Id. at 392. Nicaragua's declaration states:
On behalf of the Republic of Nicaragua, I recognize as compulsory, unconditionally the jurisdiction of the
Permanent Court of International Justice.
Geneva, 24 September 1929
(signed) T. F. Medina
The footnote to the declaration provides:
According to a telegram dated 29 November 1939, addressed to the League of Nations, Nicaragua had ratified
the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice (16 December 1920),
700 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:699
tional Justice 5-- provided the Court a proper foundation upon which to exercise
jurisdiction over the issues in question. 6
The United States had anticipated Nicaragua's application. On April 6, 1984,
three days prior to the filing of the application, the United States deposited a letter
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations7 announcing a partial and temporary
termination of its 1946 declaration. Effective immediately and for two years there-
after, the United States would no longer accept the Court's jurisdiction over disputes
arising out of or relating to events in Central America.
After Nicaragua filed its application, the United States advanced several chal-
lenges8 to the Court's ability to entertain the case concerning Military and Paramil-
itary Activities in and against Nicaragua.9 Specifically, the United States attempt to
disregard the six month notice clause presented jurisdictional issues of first impres-
sion, which directly implicated the Court's continued effectiveness and credibility.
In its November 26, 1984, decision on the issue of jurisdiction, 10 the Interna-
tional Court of Justice held that although the United States retained the right to
terminate the 1946 declaration of acceptance, its formal statement that any change
would take effect only after six months from the date of notice nevertheless created
an inescapable obligation toward other states which had accepted the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction." The Court firmly acknowledged the binding nature of the
obligations assumed by the parties pursuant to their acceptance of the optional clause
system, 12 and invalidated the United States April 6, 1984, maneuver.' 3
and the instrument of ratification was to follow. It does not appear, however, that the instrument of ratification
was ever received by the League of Nations.
Id. at 291.
5. See generally R.P. ANANo, Co.NtwtsoRv JuiusmlcnON OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTCE (1961).
6. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 395
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
7. The letter was received by the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations at 5:55 p.m.
on Friday, April 6, 1984 and provided:
I have the honor on behalf of the Government of the United States of America to refer to the Declaration
of Government of August 26, 1946, concerning the acceptance by the United States of America of the
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and state that the aforesaid Declaration shall not
apply to disputes with any Central American state or arising out of or related to events in Central America, any
of which disputes shall be settled in such manner as the parties to them may agree.
Notwithstanding the terms of the aforesaid Declaration, this proviso shall take effect immediately and shall
remain in force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional dispute settlement process which seeks a
negotiated solution to the interrelated political economic and security problems of Central America.
(signed) George P. Shultz
Secretary of State of the
United States of America.
6 April 1984
Memorial of Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings (Letter of Secretary of State, April 6, 1984) App.
H1, Exhibit B (Memorial dated June 30, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Memorial of Nicaragua]; see infra text
accompanying notes 69-71.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
9. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Jurisdiction
and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
10. Id.; see infra text accompanying note 92.
11. Id. at 419.
12. Id. at 418. See infra text accompanying notes 123-49.
13. Id. at 421. See infra text accompanying notes 123-49.
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Following a brief survey of concepts integral to an understanding of the optional
clause regime, and a procedural history of the case, this Note will consider the issues
raised by the 1984 notification: the nature of the obligations undertaken by sovereign
states accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court14 and the applicability of the
reciprocity doctrine 15 to the time limits contained in the declarations.
IX. JURISDICTION IN THE I.C.J.
In the international sphere jurisdictional questions are duly recognized and
treated as more than mere technical issues.' 6 States frequently attempt to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Court even though consent to adjudicate has been given generally
and in advance under an optional clause declaration. In those cases, the Court must
interpret the declaration and determine just what and how much is covered by the
consent given. t7
[A] distinguished authority has called jurisdictional questions "the core of the work of the
Court", and again: "The complexity of the issue of jurisdiction, and the far-reaching
ramifications of the results of a decision.., on a question of jurisdiction, are reflected
in the prominent place which these questions occupy in the general practice of the
Court.... The question whether and to what extent the Court has jurisdiction is
frequently of no less, if not of more, political importance than the decision on the merits.' 8
Sovereign states, the subjects of international law, can not be compelled to
submit their disputes to adjudication. Therefore, the declarations of consent to be
bound to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice represent unilateral
commitments fundamental to the effectiveness of the international legal order. The
Statute of the I.C.J., specifically the optional clause provision of Article 36,
paragraph 2, offers a framework for states to enter into binding legal obligations
vis-a-vis other similarly situated states and on certain conditions.
A. The Consensual Basis of Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of international tribunals is derived solely from the will of the
parties. Accordingly, the principle that no one is entitled to be the judge in his own
case, is not observed in international law.19 Concepts of sovereignty, 20 reflected in
Article 36 of the Court's Statute, establish that consent of the states is the essential
basis for the Court's jurisdiction over parties to a dispute. Paragraph 1 of Article 36
of the Statute reads, "The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the
parties refer to it, and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United
Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. ' ' 2' The Court has affirmed this
14. See infra text accompanying notes 123-49.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 49-66.
16. H. LwArWPAcHr, THE Dav .oprm;T OF INE EMAMONAL Aw By Tm ImEA'IONAL CouRt 350 (1958).
17. Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: Questions of Jurisdiction
Competence and Procedure, 34 BRrr. Y.B. IWr'L L. 1, 86 (1958).
18. Id. at 10 (quoting S. Rostusa, THE ImNmRNATONAL CouRr OF JusncE 249, 337-38 (1957)).
19. H. LAuTmEAcHT, supra note 16, at 338.
20. S. RosaNa,, THE INTEMATIONAL COURT OF JusncE 260 (1957).
21. S. RosuEsu, supra note 2, at 77.
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principle in numerous cases determining whether, under the circumstances, the
consent of both parties had been given to permit the exercise of the jurisdiction of the
Court.22 In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 2 3 case the Court stressed "the principle that the
jurisdiction of the Court to deal with and decide a case on the merits depends on the
will of the parties. Unless the parties have conferred jurisdiction on the Court in
accordance with Article 36, the Court lacks such jurisdiction."-2 4 However, accep-
tance of jurisdiction contemporary and ad hoc to the actual dispute is not necessary.25
A state's consent may be given generally and in advance pursuant to an optional
clause declaration.
B. Jurisdiction Under the Optional Clause
During the formation of both the Permanent Court of International Justice26 and
the International Court of Justice, the Great Powers made it clear that they were
unwilling to commit themselves in advance to an acceptance of compulsory juris-
diction over all parties to the Court's Statute and for all legal disputes.2 7 The optional
clause, Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Court, represents a compromise
adopted at the First Assembly of the League of Nations to obtain the consent of states
to obligatory judicial settlement.2 8
The optional clause was a compromise intended to give each party to the Statute
the option, at the time of signing or ratifying the Statute or at any time afterwards,
to make a unilateral declaration by which, on the basis of reciprocity,2 9 it recognized
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The Statute explicitly grants sovereign states
22. See Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 10 (Merits: obligation to arbitrate, Judgment of May 19);
Ambatielos (Greece v. U.K.), 1952 I.C.J. 28 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of July 1); Interpretation of Peace Treaties
(Bulg., Hung. and Rom.), 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71 (Advisory Opinion of March 30); Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Ger.
v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J., set. A, No. 12, at 22 (Judgment of Apr. 26); Eastern Carelia (Fin. v. U.S.S.R.), 1923 P.C.I.J.,
ser. B, No. 5, at 6-7 (Advisory Opinion of July 23).
In the first phase of the Nottebohm case, the court said:
Article 36 determines the cases in respect of which the Court shall have jurisdiction. It indicates that the Court
can deal with cases referred to it by agreement of the parties; and it determines the field of application of what
has come to be called the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 122 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Nov. 18).
23. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 22).
24. Id. at 103. In the words of one I.C.J. judge, "One cannot dispute the fact that the jurisdiction of the Court is
a limited one. Acceptance of jurisdiction by States is purely a voluntary act on their part .... Id. at 139 (Jurisdiction,
Judgment of July 22) (Hackworth, J., dissenting). For the individual opinions of other judges, see id. at 145 (Read, J.,
dissenting), Id. at 116 (McNair, Pres., Indiv. Opin.); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1951 I.C.J. 89, 96 (Order
of July 5) (viniarski, J. and Badawi, J., dissenting); Chorzow Factory (Ger. v. Pol.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at
39 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 26) (Ehrlich, J., dissenting).
25. Fitzmaurice, supra note 17, at 68 n.4. On the other hand, the unilateral, voluntary act of accepting the Court's
jurisdiction pursuant to the optional clause notifies the world that the declarant state is prepared to submit certain classes
of disputes to the Court's judicial scrutiny. Id. at 140. Professor Anthony D'Amato has highlighted the offensive potential
of accepting the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and urges that "every state [that] professes to act legally on the
international plane . . . should join the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court." D'Amato, Modifying U.S.
Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the World Court, 79 Ai. J. IWtL L. 385, 386 (1985).
26. For an in-depth treatment of the transition from the P.C.I.J. to the I.C.J. see R.P. ANmAO, supra note 5, ch.
2; S. RosENNE, supra note 20, at 302.
27. See Waldock, Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 Biur. Y.B. INr'L L. 244 (1955).
28. The optional clause was adopted at the San Francisco Conference of 1945 in terms which are identical in all
material respects to the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the P.C.I.J. See generally R.P. ANsAN, supra note 5.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 49-66.
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within the optional clause system the power to define the classes of legal disputes to
which their declaration applies. 30 Paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute provides:
The States parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as
compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state
accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concern-
ing:
a. the interpretation of a treaty;
b. any question of international law;
c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an
international obligation;
d. the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation. 3'
Optional clause jurisdiction exists when both parties have made declarations
pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 2, in terms that cover the dispute brought before the
Court. While each of these declarations is by itself a unilateral act32 and not a treaty
resulting from negotiations, 33 the coincidence of two declarations creates a consen-
sual bond establishing contractual relations between the parties. 34 By these declara-
tions, jurisdiction is conferred on the Court to the extent that the two declarations
coincide. 35
Sir Arnold McNair's individual opinion in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 36 case
serves as a concise overview of the system of compulsory jurisdiction. In that case,
McNair observed:
Under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice no State was under any obligation to accept the jurisdiction of that
Court. However, Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute afforded to States an opportunity
of doing so by means of a voluntary act. That paragraph.., was in the nature of a
standing invitation made on behalf of the Court to Members of the League of Nations to
accept as compulsory, on the basis of reciprocity, the whole or any part of the jurisdiction
of the Court as therein defined. It should be noted that the machinery provided by that
paragraph is that of "contracting in", not of "contracting out". A State, being free either
to make a Declaration or not, is entitled, if it decides to make one, to limit the scope of
its Declaration in any way it chooses, subject always to reciprocity. Another State seeking
to found the jurisdiction of the Court upon it must shew that the Declarations of both States
concur in comprising the dispute in question within their scope. 37
30. Waldock, supra note 27, at 244.
31. S. Rose;NE, supra note 2, at 77.
32. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1964 I.C.J. 6, 29 (Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of July 24); Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.). 1938 P.C.I.J., ser. AB, No. 74, at 23 (Judgment of June
14).
33. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 105 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 22).
34. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 146 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of Nov. 26).
35. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 103 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 22).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 116. (McNair, J., Sep. Opin.).
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C. Reservations
One of the most difficult problems related to declarations under the optional
clause is the question of reservations from compulsory jurisdiction. Article 36,
paragraph 3, provides that the declarations referred to above may be made uncondi-
tionally or on condition of reciprocity on the part of several or certain states. 38 The
declarations may also be made for a limited or an indefinite period. 39
Article 36 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice did not
expressly provide for reservations. It appeared from the text of Article 36 that states
would specify in their declarations which of the categories of legal disputes enumer-
ated in Article 36 would come within the scope of the declarant's acceptance. 40
However, a long and unbroken practice has rejected that interpretation4' and, despite
the absence of textual authority, states almost immediately began qualifying their
declarations with a wide range of reservations. 42 Commentators have typically
asserted that the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice provided an
inherent right to qualify an acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by limitations,
reservations, and conditions. 43 Thus, by 1945 "[s]tate practice had declared itself
firmly in favour of the right of attaching to declarations what are now called
reservations, both of a kind mentioned in the Statute, and of other kinds." 44
The report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV/14 5 at the initial Conference at San
Francisco emphasized the freedom of a state accepting compulsory jurisdiction under
the optional clause to except large categories of disputes from its acceptance: 46
The question of reservations calls for an explanation. As is well known, the article has
consistently been interpreted in the past as allowing States accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court to subject their declarations to reservations. The sub-committee has considered such
interpretation as being henceforth established. It has, therefore, been considered unnec-
essary to modify [Article 36] paragraph 3 in order to make express reference to the right
of the States to make such reservations.- 7
The right to unilaterally append substantive exceptions to an acceptance of the
optional clause evolved to reconcile the political realities of state sovereignty with the
promotion of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.48 The rights of reservation
38. S. RosvrN, supra note 2, at 77.
39. Only ten declarations contain no time limit and are therefore classified as "indefinite." 1981-1982 I.C.J.Y.B.
64-93 (1982) (Colombia, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Uganda, Uruguay).
40. Hambro, Some Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 76 REcuEn.
Dts Cou s 125, 183 (1950 I).
41. Id.
42. The League of Nations encouraged this process. See Records of Fifth Assembly Committees, League ofNations
Does., i1, at 189-98; Id. Plenary at 225 (Resolution of October 2, 1924); Records of Ninth Assembly, Plenary at 183
(Resolution of September 26, 1928); see also S. RosEa,,, supra note 20, at 310-11.
43. See, e.g., Crawford, The Legal Effect of Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International Court, 50 Ba-.
Y.B. INT'L L. 63, 79 (1979); Hambro, supra note 40, at 183.
44. S. Rosra, supra note 20, at 311; Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 46 (Judgment of July
6) (Lauterpacht, J., Sep. Opin.).
45. 13 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 391-92 (1945).
46. Waldock, supra note 27, at 249.
47. 13 U.N.C.I.O. Does. 391-92.
48. Memorial of United States of America (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. Pleadings 218-19 (Memorial dated August
17, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Memorial of United States].
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enumerated in Article 36, paragraph 3, highlight the tension between the desire to
promote use of the Court and the realization that the adherence of sovereign states to
the terms of their own declarations may depend upon the flexibility afforded them in
fashioning their acceptances in light of changing conditions.
The other condition mentioned in Article 36, paragraph 3, that declarations may
be made "for a certain time" has been interpreted by states to grant complete freedom
to limit the duration of their declarations. The issue of duration in conjunction with
the inherent right of reciprocity occupied a pivotal role in the Court's resolution of the
disputes over jurisdiction between Nicaragua and the United States.
D. Reciprocity
The doctrine of reciprocity allows a state to invoke certain limitations and
reservations not listed in its own declaration but included in an opposing state's
declaration of acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. Reciprocity is an absolute
condition49 inherent in the optional clause itself under which a declaration may be
made accepting compulsory jurisdiction "in relation to any other state accepting the
same obligation.' 50
Taken literally, the words "accepting the same obligation" might seem to imply that one
State is bound to another under the Optional Clause only when the obligations assumed
in their respective declarations are exactly, or at least broadly, the same. But such an
interpretation of the words would have been highly prejudicial to the development of
compulsory jurisdiction.... The effect would have been to divide the States adhering to
the Optional Clause into small groups whose members had made the same or similar
declarations ....
... The words have not, however, been treated as laying down a condition that exactly,
or even broadly the same obligation of compulsory jurisdiction must have been accepted
by each State. The words "in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation"
have rather been interpreted as requiring that there shall be complete reciprocity in the
operation of compulsory jurisdiction under the Optional Clause as between two States
which have accepted the obligation in different terms. This interpretation emerges very
clearly from the attitude of States before the Court and from the jurisprudence of the
Court.
52
49. Hambro, supra note 40, at 184.
50. S. RosENNE, supra note 2, at 77 (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 "simply authorizes states to accept compulsory
jurisdiction under the Optional Clause for limited periods, and to make their liability to jurisdiction conditional on
compulsory jurisdiction having been also accepted by a particular number of other States. . . . This paragraph does not
relate to 'reciprocity."' Waldock, supra note 27, at 255. Reciprocity is instead a basic constitutional provision of the
Statute applying to every declaration. Id. Thus, whether a declaration contains the formal statement that it is made "on
condition of reciprocity" or the statement that it is made "without condition," the condition of reciprocity emanates from
the language of Article 36, paragraph 2. Speaking on this subject Professor Hudson states:
Every declaration made under paragraph 2 of Article 36, whether it is made by signature of the optional clause
or otherwise, has this [reciprocal] characteristic impressed upon it. It is not a reservation made by the declarant;
it is a limitation in the very nature of the declaration which operates under or is made "in conformity with"
paragraph 2 of Article 36.
M.O. Huosou, THE PsasNErT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL Jusrncs 453 (1925).
52. Waldock, supra note 27, at 255-58; see Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (BeIg. v. BuIg.), 1939
P.C.I.J., ser. AB, No. 77, at 81 (Judgment of April 4); Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 74, at 22 (Judgment of June 14).
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Jurisdiction under the optional clause is conferred on the Court only to the extent to
which the two declarations coincide in conferring it.52
Like the right to reserve limitations on the scope of a state's obligation to
adjudicate in the I.C.J., the doctrine of reciprocity is a product of political reality:
sovereign states will refuse to be bound vis-a-vis another state that has not similarly
subjected itself to the jurisdiction of the Court. This common ground principle
embodied in the reciprocity doctrine guarantees that the common will of the parties
governs the extent of the Court's jurisdiction. Thus, jurisdiction in a particular case
exists only within the narrower limits established by the state which placed the
broader reservations on its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. 53
Two distinct levels of obligation attach to states that are parties to the optional
clause system. At the first level, which is attained immediately upon proper filing of
a declaration with the Registry, a state enters into a consensual relationship with other
states similarly accepting optional clause jurisdiction. The obligations undertaken are
"not irrevocably fixed at the time when declarations are deposited." 54 The second
level arises upon the filing of an application linking two states whose declarations are
currently in force. Thus, the substance of the conditions and limitations contained in
a state's declaration need to be considered only upon the filing of an application with
the Court. At that moment, reciprocity operates to equalize the extent of the
obligations which will bind the parties, and to define the parameters of the Court's
jurisdiction. To invoke the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, the substance of an
application must fall within the common ground staked out by the rule of reciprocity.
The key event in determining the jurisdiction of the Court is the date the Court
is seised of a case by the filing of an application, this being the date when all the
elements necessary to give the Court jurisdiction are present.55 The rule in the
Nottebohm56 case mandates that no modifications or amendments subsequent to the
filing of an application will divest the Court of jurisdiction properly established at the
date of seisin. 57 Reciprocity does not alter a declaration, it merely acts as a sliding
scale to adjust the scope of the commitments of both parties for the purpose of
determining whether the subject matter of the dispute falls within the zone of mutual
consent to adjudicate.
The Permanent Court of International Justice was first directly confronted with
the reciprocity issue in the Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case. 58 The
declaration of Belgium, the plaintiff state, contained a limitation ratione temporis.
However, the defendant state, Bulgaria, had deposited an unconditional acceptance
of the optional clause. Bulgaria was permitted to avoid the Court's jurisdiction
52. Waldock, supra note 27, at 261; Fitzmaurice, supra note 17, at 75.
53. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 23-24 (Judgment of July 6); Briggs, Nicaragua v. United
States: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 79 Am. J. ,rr'L L. 373, 376 (1985); see Fitzmaurice, supra note 17, at 76.
54. Briggs, supra note 53, at 376.
55. South West Africa (Ethiopia v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.J. 319, 499 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Dec. 21)
(Spender, J., and Fitzmaurice, J., Jt. Dissenting Opin.).
56. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Nov. 18).
57. Id. at 122.
58. Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Beig. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. AIB, No. 77 (Preliminary
Objection, Judgment of Apr. 4).
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because of the limitation contained in the Belgian declaration. The Court observed
that:
Although this limitation does not appear in the Bulgarian Government's own declaration,
it is common ground that, in consequence of the condition of reciprocity laid down in
paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Court's Statute and repeated in the Bulgarian declaration,
it is applicable between the parties.59
In the Certain Norwegian Loans case, 60 France instituted proceedings in a
dispute with Norway concerning the payment of Norwegian loans issued in France.
The French declaration accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court contained
the following reservation: "This declaration does not apply to differences relating to
matters which are essentially within the national jurisdiction as understood by the
Government of the French Republic." ' 61 The Norwegian Government successfully
invoked the French reservation, claiming that "the Norwegian Government cannot be
bound, vis-a-vis the French Government, by undertakings which are either broader or
stricter than those given by the latter Government.'"62 The jurisdiction of the Court
depended on the unilateral declarations of the two states, both of which were subject
to the condition of reciprocity. "A comparison between the two Declarations shows
that the French Declaration accepts the Court's jurisdiction within narrower limits
than the Norwegian Declaration; consequently, the common will of the Parties, which
is the basis of the Court's jurisdiction, exists within the narrower limits indicated by
the French reservation. "63 As a result, Norway was entitled to exempt disputes
defined by Norway as within its national jurisdiction from the compulsory jurisdiction
of the Court. 64
These typical uses of reciprocity are well accepted and approved by the
international community. However, states' limitations on the length of their decla-
rations' validity and the manner and notice period they have prescribed for themselves
concerning the right to modify, amend, or terminate their declarations raise awkward
questions of reciprocity.
The Nicaragua case questions whether the parties are entitled to invoke and rely
upon manner and notice period reservations contained in the declarations of potential
adversaries in order to make changes in their own declaration. 65
The previous discussion makes it clear that the reciprocity principle does not
function to define the common jurisdictional ground until an application is filed; no
jurisdictional commitments are altered under the rule of reciprocity until an applica-
tion is filed. Under the rule in Nottebohm,66 any substantive changes in a declaration
that might have been effected pursuant to a durational condition in that state's
59. Id. at 81.
60. Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (Judgment of July 6).
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 24.
65. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 420
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26); see supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
66. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. I I 1 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Nov. 18).
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declaration are irrelevant if made after the filing of an application. Therefore, once
an application has beenfiled a state party can neither invoke its own reserved right
to alter its commitment, nor can it invoke any such rights reserved in an opponent's
declaration in the hope of avoiding jurisdiction in that particular case.
Despite the clarity and consistency of these conclusions, the United States
argued that it was entitled, on the basis of reciprocity, to benefit from durational
conditions supposedly contained in the Nicaraguan declaration prior to the date on
which Nicaragua filed its application. 67 However, reciprocity of temporal limitations
prior to the seisin of the Court proves untenable; in the Nicaragua case the I.C.J.
properly rejected the United States argument for pre-seisin reciprocity.
]EII. CASE CONCERNING MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY AcrIvrrIEs IN AND
AGAINST NICARAGUA (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
On April 8, 1984, the United States State Department publicly announced that
it would not accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in disputes
involving Central America for the next two years. 68 The unexpected and unprece-
dented move was a hasty reaction to information that Nicaragua was considering
bringing charges against the United States concerning American financial support and
military supervision of anti-Government rebel activities in and against Nicaragua. 69
These activities included mining operations that damaged foreign commercial ships
in and around several Nicaraguan harbors. 70 Only one week earlier, the United States
had vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for a halt to these activities. 71 On
April 6, 1984, in the wake of mounting public disapproval of U.S. actions, 72 the State
Department issued a communication to the United Nations Secretary-General, refer-
ring to the United States 1946 declaration and stating that:
[The aforesaid Declaration shall not apply to disputes with any Central American State or
arising out of or related to events in Central America, any of which disputes shall be settled
in such manner as the parties to them may agree.
Notwithstanding the terms of the aforesaid declaration, this proviso shall take effect
immediately and shall remain in force for two years, so as to foster the continuing regional
dispute settlement process which seeks a negotiated solution to the interrelated political,
economic and security problems of Central America 73
The Departmental Statement of April 8, 1984, provided the American public
with the following explanation:
This step has been taken to preclude the Courts' being misused to divert attention
from the real issues in the region and to disrupt the ongoing regional peace process by
67. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 416-17
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
68. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at App. II, Exhibit C; see infra text accompanying note 74.
69. Gwertzman, U.S. Voids Role of World Court on Latin Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1984, at Al, cot. 1.
70. Rogers, Reagan Snubs World Court Over Nicaragua, Wall St. J., Apr. 6, 1984, at 1, col. 1.
71. Gwertzman, supra note 69.
72. Rogers, supra note 70.
73. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at App. II, Exhibit B.
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protracted litigation of claims and counter-claims.... We do not wish to see the Court
abused as a forum for furthering a propaganda campaign.- 4
On April 9, 1984, the Republic of Nicaragua filed an application which
recounted a series of events spanning the time period from March 1981 to the present
day. In particular, Nicaragua accused the United States of violating its international
legal obligations "by organizing, training, supporting and directing a 10,000 man
mercenary army operating against Nicaragua from bases in Honduras; by mining
Nicaraguan ports, invading its airspace and attacking major economic instal
lations... and by seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua ...."75
These activities, Nicaragua claimed, had caused it grievous harm by violating its
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, the most fundamental
and universally accepted principles of international law. 76
At the time the application was filed, the Republic of Nicaragua also filed a
request for the Court's recommendation of provisional measures under Article 41 of
the Statute. 77 In view of the urgent nature of Nicaragua's request, the Court, by Order
of May 10, 1984,78 directed the parties and other states in the region to take certain
provisional measures. Although the special provisions in Article 4179 enable indica-
tion of such provisional measures, the Court further was required to derive its
jurisdiction to deal with the merits of the case from Article 36.80
In claiming the Court had jurisdiction, Nicaragua relied on the United States
acceptance of jurisdiction in its declaration dated August 14, 1946.81 To rely on the
optional clause as the basis for the Court's jurisdiction under Article 36, Nicaragua
claimed it was a "State accepting the same obligation." '8 2 To this end, Nicaragua
relied on its own declaration, dated September 24, 1929, which purports to "recog-
nize as compulsory unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice.''83 The Nicaraguan declaration is unconditional, containing
neither time limits nor substantive reservations. The United States declaration,
74. Id. at App. II, Exhibit C.
75. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at T 1.
76. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169, 170
(Provisional Measures Order of May 10).
77. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 395
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
78. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169 (Provisional
Measures Order of May 10).
79. S. Rosem, supra note 2, at 81. Article 41 provides:
1) The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional
measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party.
2) Pending the final decision, notice of the measures suggested shall forthwith be given to the parties and to the
Security Council.
80. See Anglo-Iranian Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 22).
81. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 415
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26); see supra note 3.
82. See supra text accompanying note 66.
83. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 82 (1983); see supra note 4.
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however, was qualified by three substantive reservations 84 and could be terminated
only six months after notice was given to that effect.85
Because the interpretation and interaction of the United States and Nicaragua's
declarations before and after the filing of the application on April 9, 1984, were issues
determinative of jurisdiction, the Court required these two nations to submit memo-
rials solely addressed to the question of jurisdiction. 86
Both parties advanced several arguments on the issues of jurisdiction and
admissibility. Nicaragua's memorial argued that the declarations of the parties, both
of which were in force as valid and binding acceptances of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction on the date the application was filed, and both of which embraced the
legal dispute presented in the application fully established the Court's jurisdiction. 87
The United States claimed that Nicaragua itself never effectively accepted the
Court's jurisdiction. 88 The United States also relied on the April 6, 1984, notification
and argued that the claims presented were not within the scope of its modified
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. 89
The Court found by a vote of 11-5 that the Nicaraguan Declaration of 1929
constituted a valid and binding declaration of acceptance. Because it is extremely
unlikely that such an issue will arise again, the more significant jurisdictional question
concerned the United States 1984 letter of notification: whether the United States was
84. The U.S. Declaration of 1946 explicitly exempts three categories of dispute from the scope of its acceptance
of compulsory jurisdiction:
a. disputes the solution of which the parties shall entrust to other tribunals by virtue of agreements already
in existence or which may be concluded in the future; or
b. disputes with regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States
of America as determined by the United States of America; or
c. disputes arising under a multilateral treaty, unless (1) all parties to the treaty affected by the decision are
also parties to the case before the Court, or (2) the United States of America specially agrees to jurisdic-
tion....
1981-1982 I.C.J.Y.B. 92 (1982).
85. The United States manner and notice reservation states "that [the 1946] declaration shall remain in force for
a period of five years and thereafter until the expiration of six months after notice may be given to terminate this
declaration." Id.
86. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 488 (Interim
Protection Order of May 14). By order of May 14, 1984, the Court directed Nicaragua to file with the Court by June 3,
1984, a Memorial addressing those issues and directed that the United States file a Counter-memorial on the same issues
by August 17, 1984. Oral arguments were heard in The Hague between October 8-18, 1984.
87. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 2-3. In addition, Nicaragua asserted that the claims presented fell
within the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between
the United States and Nicaragua, executed on January 21, 1956. Id. at 85-90. 9 U.S.T. 448; T.I.A.S. No. 4024.
Furthermore, Nicaragua denied that political considerations or the Contadora regional peace process barred the Court from
adjudicating the legal claims presented. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 96-105.
88. Memorial of United States, supra note 48, at 200.
89. Id. The United States denied the admissibility of Nicaragua's claims on three grounds: (1) Nicaragua's claims
implicate the rights of indispensible parties, (2) Nicaragua is already committed to alternative modes of peaceful resolution
and (3) the determinations to be made have been entrusted by the United Nations Charter to the United Nations Security
Council. Id. at 3, 270-343. However,
Article 33 of the United Nations Charter clearly specifies that the Court may deal with the legal aspects of
political controversies, as it did in the hostage and peacekeeping-expenses case. . . . [The U.S.] has repeatedly
and properly argued that national claims of self-defense raise issues of international law that can be reviewed
by international bodies.
Gardner, It Was Wrong to Duck the World Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1985, at 26, col. 4.
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free to disregard the clause of six month notice which, freely and by its own choice,
it had appended to its 1946 declaration. 90
Nicaragua v. United States was a case of first impression on many of the
jurisdictional issues raised. 9' On November 26, 1984, the Court decided in favor of
both the jurisdiction and admissibility of the issues raised in Nicaragua's applica-
tion. 92 The Court's discussion of the nature of the obligations undertaken by the filing
of a declaration, the nature of the relationship established upon the filing of an
application between similarly situated states, and the relationship of temporal limi-
tations with the statutory right of reciprocity, will have far-reaching consequences for
the development of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. The following sections of
this Note analyze the Court's resolution of these issues and the future implications of
both the majority and separate opinions.
A. State Practice-The Reality of the Right to Modify
The United States contended that the 1984 letter "effected a valid modification
temporarily suspending the consent of the United States to the adjudication of
[Nicaragua's] claims." 93 Nicaragua conceded that if this contention were true, the
Court would be without jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings, at least under Article
36 of the Statute. 94 However, Nicaragua maintained that the United States Declaration
of 1946 was subject to the proviso that six months notice was required to terminate
it, and contended that:
First, the principles of the law of treaties apply generally to the modification and
termination of declarations of acceptance of jurisdiction under the optional clause.
Secondly, a declaration which lays down express conditions for termination or modifi-
cation cannot be terminated or modified except on those conditions or on some other
ground recognized in the law of treaties. Thirdly, the conditions laid down in respect of
termination or modification must also be compatible with the Statute of the Court.
90. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
91. Memorial of United States, supra note 48, at 3-4.
92. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 442
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26). The Court found, by a vote of 11 to 5, that Nicaragua had accepted
the Court's compulsory jurisdiction and that the United States also had acceded to that jurisdiction for the purposes of this
case. By a vote of 14 to 2, the Court found that it had jurisdiction to consider whether any of Nicaragua's claims violate
provisions of the 1956 bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation Treaty. Based on these two votes, with only Judge
Schwebel of the United States dissenting on both, the Court reached a general conclusion by a vote of 15 to 1 that it had
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute. Finally, the Court unanimously rejected the U.S. arguments on admissibility and thus
declared itself an appropriate forum for Nicaragua's claims against the United States. Vincour, World Court Acts To
Overrule U.S. In Nicaragua Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at 1, col. 6.
Following the decision, U.S. officials commented that the Administration would now be forced to either "'defy an
order by the World Court and face international opprobrium as a lawless nation, or abandon its policy in
Nicaragua .... "Taylor, U.S. Is Now Facing Decision On Court, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1984, at 6, col. 3. One official
predicted "that the United States is going to have to denounce the World Court. It is clearly foreseeable that we're going
to lose on the merits, and anybody who doubts that is nuts." Id. at col. 5.
On January 18, 1985, the U.S. State Department publicly announced its refusal to submit to adjudication on the
merits, by releasing the text of a statement called "U.S. Withdrawal From the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
International Court of Justice." N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 4, col. 1.
93. Memorial of United States, supra note 48, at 200.
94. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 415
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
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Fourthly, the United States [declaration] of 6 April [1984] is an invalid attempt to modify
or vary the existing United States declaration which has been neither validly varied nor
terminated and thus remains in force. Fifthly, and alternatively, the [declaration] of 6
April has the effect of terminating the original declaration but.., on its express terms
that termination can only take effect six months after notice.
95
The United States attempted to distinguish between modifications and termina-
tions and insisted that "notwithstanding the fact that its 1946 Declaration did not
expressly reserve a right of modification . . . the 1984 notification effected a valid
modification of the 1946 Declaration" 96 because the Court has recognized the
existence of a sovereign, inherent, extra-statutory right to modify declarations made
under Article 36, at any time until the date of filing of an application, in any manner
not inconsistent with the Statute.97 The United States supported this argument with
reference to state practice under both the P.C.I.J. and the I.C.J. that allegedly
demonstrated that a declaration is subject to modification before an application is
filed, even though the right to do so has not been reserved.
In the early years of the P.C.I.J., most of the signatory states accepted the
optional clause for a fixed period, and then renewed the period upon expiration of the
original term. 98 Several early acceptances contained no time limits. 99 In 1929, Great
Britain and five of the Commonwealth States1°° accepted the Court's jurisdiction "for
10 years and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate the
acceptance."'' 0 1 In 1939, these declarations became duly terminable on notice and in
1940 South Africa deposited a new declaration explicitly terminable on immediate
notice. 102
This practice is commonplace under the optional clause regime of the I.C.J. Of
the forty-seven declarations currently in effect, twenty-two have expressly reserved
the right to terminate on notice. 103 Fifteen declarations have reserved a right to modify
95. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 169, 179
(Provisional Measures Order of May 10).
96. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 415
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
97. Id. at 415-16. Professor Herbert W. Briggs traces the fallatial U.S. argument that the condition of reciprocity
applies to the time limits which states insert in their declarations to Sir Humphrey Waldock, "from which dissenting judges
freely quote in the current case." Briggs, supra note 53, at 377 n.5.
98. Practice under the P.C.I.J. is described in Waldock, supra note 27, at 268-69; see Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 500 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of
Nov. 26). (Oda, J., Sep. Opin.).
99. See, e.g., Portugal (1921), Salvador (1921), Costa Rica (1921), Liberia (1921), Bulgaria (1921), Haiti (1921),
Panama (1921), Dominican Republic (1924), Guatemala (1926), Nicaragua (1929), Colombia 1 (1932), Paraguay (1933),
Colombia H (1937). 9 P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 9, at 289-300.
100. 6 P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 6, at 480-84. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India and South Africa.
101. 6 P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 6, at 479. Great Britain introduced the concept of immediate terminability with
a declaration which read in part as follows: "I accept as compulsory . . . the jurisdiction of the Court . . . for a period
of ten years and thereafter until such time as notice may be given to terminate the acceptance ....
102. 16 P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 16, at 326.
103. Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Canada, Democratic Kampuchea, Gambia, India, Israel, Japan,
Kenya, Liberia, Malta, Mauritius, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, and United
Kingdom. Of the 22 declarations with immediate rights of termination, 10 also have reserved rights of immediate
alteration. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 59-92 (1983).
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with immediate effect.104 These durational conditions often have been invoked to
terminate existing declarations and substitute amended versions that are narrower in
scope. 105 State practice likewise reflects the tendency of states to alter the scope of
their consent with the singular "intention of avoiding adjudication of matters that
came within the scope of the previous declaration and, in several cases, of avoiding
the filing of an application in a particular pending dispute." 1°6
The most persuasive argument in support of the contention that declarations are
inherently modifiable at will points for support to the acts of certain states which
altered or amended their declarations in the absence of a reserved right to do so. There
have been five such occasions.
In 1936, Colombia modified its 1932 declaration, which did not contain a
reservation of a right to terminate or modify its terms. 10 7 No objections were provoked
when Colombia filed a new declaration in 1937 incorporating the modification
excluding matters arising prior to 1932.108
In 1938, Paraguay purported to withdraw its acceptance of the optional clause. 109
Paraguay's 1933 declaration, like Nicaragua's, contained no time limit. Six states
objected to Paraguay's denunciation. 110 The Court continued to list Paraguay among
104. Australia, Botswana, Canada, El Salvador, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, New Zealand (limited), Norway
(limited), Portugal, Somalia, Swaziland, Togo, and United Kingdom. This is nearly a third of the declarations now
existing. 1981-1982 I.C.J.Y.B. 59-92 (1982). Portugal initiated this trend with a declaration of 1955 containing a
condition which read: "The Portugese Government reserves the right to exclude from the scope of the present declaration,
at any time during its validity, any given category or categories of disputes, by notifying the Secretary-General of the
United Nations and with effect from the moment of such notification." Id. at 86.
105. See, e.g., Australia (Feb. 6, 1954), 1954-1955 I.C.J.Y.B. 189 (1955); Canada (Apr. 7, 1970), 1969-1970
I.C.J.Y.B. 55 (1970); France (July 10, 1959, May 20, 1966), 1958-1959 I.C.J.Y.B. 212 (1959), 1966-1967 I.C.J.Y.B.
52 (1967); India (Sep. 15, 1974) 1974-1975 I.C.J.Y.B. 59 (1975); Philippines (Jan. 18, 1972), 1971-1972 I.C.J.Y.B.
78 (1972); South Africa (Sep. 13, 1955), 1955-1956 I.C.J.Y.B. 198 (1956); United Kingdom (June 2, 1955, Oct. 31,
1955, Apr. 12, 1957, Nov. 26, 1958), 1954-1955 I.C.J.Y.B. 198 (1955), 1955-1956 I.C.J.Y.B. 197 (1956), 1957-1958
I.C.J.Y.B. 211 (1958), 1958-1959 I.C.J.Y.B. 225 (1959); see S. RosENN, supra note 2, at 345-416.
106. Memorial of the United States, supra note 48, at 226. For example, Australia narrowed the scope of its
acceptance in 1954 to fnistrate a possible Japanese application to determine rights to pearl fisheries off the Australian
coast. See Waldock, supra note 27, at 267-68.
107. 13 P.C.I.J. AsN. R., ser. E, No. 13, at 276-77. By a letter dated August 27, 1936, the Secretary-General of
the League of Nations, at the request of the Colombian Government, informed the Members of the League of an error in
the wording of the text of Colombia's declaration accepting the Optional Clause. Consequently, the following reservation
was added to the original declaration of January 6, 1932:
In accordance with Article 2 of law No. 38 of 1930, authorizing the President of the Republic to accept the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court as provided in Article 36 of its Statute, this declaration is made with a reservation
concerning disputes prior to January 6th, 1932, the date on which it was signed.
Id.
108. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 61 (1983).
109. 14 P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 14, at 57.
110. Bolivia, Belgium, Brazil, Sweden, Czechoslovakia, Netherlands. 15 P.C.I.J. ANN . R., ser. E, No. 15, at 227
(1938-39). None of the six states protesting the legal ramifications of Paraguay's cancellation clearly stated their reasons,
"but two of them, the Netherlands and Czechoslovakia, did indicate that they regarded the questions as being governed
by the law relating to the termination of treaties." R.P. ANAND, supra note 5, at 177.
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the states accepting its jurisdiction until the 1959-60 Yearbook. Similar scenarios have
involved France and the Commonwealth States, 1 ' El Salvador, 112 and Israel." 3
The United States argument concluded that, in light of state practice, "it would
be unfair to hold a state to its self-chosen words."' 114 Nicaragua reasserted the view
taken by numerous commentators: that the practice of states provides no support for
the view that declarations can be terminated or modified at will." 5
The arguments of both parties explicitly acknowledge the rule in the Nottebohm
case 1 6 that categorically precludes a modification or termination from affecting the
jurisdiction of the Court after the Court has been validly seised of a case." t7 In
consequence of this rule of law, no government may effectively terminate its
declaration in whole or in part after the moment of seisin, in any way that purports
to divest the Court of jurisdiction."t8
The United States argument in the present case relied primarily on a state's
inherent right to modify a declaration in a manner contrary to the terms contained in
the document, prior to the filing of an application. The Court was thereby confronted
with a matter prima impressionis"1 9 in that the 1984 letter of notification which
contradicted the terms of the United States 1946 declaration was received by the
United Nations Secretariat "only hours before seisin and in direct contemplation of
the particular case of which the Court is seised."1 20 What the United States argument
studiously avoids, and what the Court clearly points out, is that a mutual obligation,
sui generis in nature, does in fact arise upon the filing of a declaration. 12 1 This
obligation is governed by principles of integrity and good faith drawn by analogy from
the law of treaties.' 22 The reasons for the Court's rejection of the United States
111. In 1939, France, United Kingdom and five Commonwealth States amended their unexpired declarations to
exclude disputes arising out of World War II. See 20 LEAoU OF NATioNS O.J., 407-10 (1939). Eleven states objected. 16
P.C.I.J. ANN. R., ser. E, No. 16, at 333-43.
112. In 1973, El Salvador replaced its 1930 declaration, which provided no fixed time limits, because of perceived
fundamental changes in existing circumstances. 1981-1982 I.C.J.Y.B. 66 (1982). Honduras entered an objection
challenging El Salvador's right to denounce, modify, or broaden a declaration not expressly reserving a right to do so in
the original declaration. Honduras referred to the objections entered in 1938 when Paraguay sought to revoke unilaterally,
and argued that condoning such practice would mean accepting the notion that a State unilaterally could terminate its
obligation to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court whenever that suits its interests, thus denying other States the right
to summon it before the Court to seek a settlement of disputes to which they are parties. This could very well undermine
the universally applicable principle of respect for treaties and for the principles of international law.
S. RosENE, supra note 2, at 363.
113. In 1984, Israel made two modifications to its 1956 declaration, which was terminable on notice but contained
no provision for modification. 1982-1983 I.C.J.Y.B. 69-70 (1983).
114. Briggs, supra note 53, at 377.
115. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 69 (citing with approval M.O. HuDsoN, TE PrsuAAszr COURT OF
INTERMATIONAL JUsncE 1920-1942 476 (1943); 2 L. OPFENHmiM, ImrrNATioNAL LAW 61 (7th ed. 1952); I. S TA, TE Po'wE
OF THE IMEMRAIONAL COURTTo Dmriim~I us owN JuISDICTION 164-67 (1965); Merrills, The Optional Clause Today, 50 Birr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 87, 94-96 (1979); Waldock, supra note 27, at 263-65).
116. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. I l1 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Nov. 18).
117. Id. at 122.
118. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 125, 142 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of Nov. 26).
119. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 546-47
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26) (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.).
120. Id. at 547 (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.).
121. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 417-18
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
122. Id. at 418-19; see infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
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position are considered in the following sections. This Note then examines reciprocity
as a vehicle for altering the scope of a unilaterally fashioned term of adherence to the
optional clause.
B. The Binding Character of Declarations
In discussing the nature of the obligations created by optional clause declara-
tions, the International Court of Justice confronted two issues: the relevance of
distinguishing between express reservations of the power to modify or terminate and
time-limits; and whether the principles of the law of treaties govern consensual legal
relationships.
Concerning the first issue, the Court summarily established as irrelevant the
attempt to categorize the 1984 notification as a "modification" or a "termination"
of the 1946 declaration. 23 Although the possible distinction had been discussed in
earlier cases, 124 the Court was unconcerned with the characterization of the substan-
tive change attempted by the United States April 6, 1984, notification. The Court
focused instead on the procedural correctness of the United States attempt to alter the
scope of its obligations with immediate effect.
The truth is that it is intended to secure a partial and temporary termination, namely to
exempt, with immediate effect, the United States from the obligation to subject itself to
the Court's jurisdiction with regard to any application concerning disputes with Central
American States, and disputes arising out of events in Central America. 2 5
The United States was not attempting a specific act of modification or termina-
tion in reciprocal reliance on an express reservation of a right to modify contained in
the Nicaraguan declaration; the United States instead argued for the applicability of
reciprocity to procedural time limits. Because the Court was not forced to determine
whether reciprocity applies to substantive reservations of the right to modify, the
potential remains for the development of pre-seisin reciprocity.
Discussing the second issue, the rules of interpretation applicable to unilateral
commitments under the optional clause, the Court firmly established the binding
nature of the obligations that arise upon the filing of a declaration. 2 6 Because each
state's declaration of acceptance is a unilateral act, by such acceptance each state
undertakes an obligation to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in relation to every other
state undertaking the same obligation. 27
123. Id. at 417-18. Judge Mosler agreed that the question whether the 1984 notification constituted a modification
or a termination was not relevant. Id. at 465 (Mosler, J., Sep. Opin.). Judge Jennings observed that "one need not spend
much time on the somewhat theoretical question whether the Shultz letter amounts to a modification or a substitution of
the 1946 Declaration. The major problems of principle would apply to either." Id. at 546 (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.);
accord id. at 616-17 (Schwebel, J., Sep. Opin.).
124. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1957 I.C.J. 142-44 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of Nov. 26). The Court accepted a distinction between modification and termination, noting that a proper modification
of a subsisting declaration affords reciprocal benefits to other States in an adjudication.
125. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 417-18
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[T]he interlocking declarations generate obligations which do not have a treaty character
as such, but constitute, nonetheless, obligations of a 'bilateral' or consensual character
governed by international law and subject to . . .general principles of treaty
interpretation ....
though with some necessary modification in light of the unilateral nature of the
individual instruments. 28
Thus, although declarations are unilateral in form, they give rise to mutual rights
and obligations.' 29 The majority characterized the optional clause system as a
"network of engagements" 130 and declared that:
[T]he unilateral nature of declarations does not signify that the State making the decla-
ration is free to amend the scope and contents of its solemn commitments as it
pleases ....
In fact, the declarations, even though they are unilateral acts, establish a series of
bilateral engagements with other States accepting the same obligation of compulsory
jurisdiction.' 3'
The Court flatly rejected the United States contention that declarations are
inherently modifiable prior to the date an application is filed.132 The Court then turned
to the principles of interpretation it found applicable to declarations. The parties
conceded and the Court affirmed that declarations, being formal statements of
intention, could not be strictly categorized as treaties or contracts. Thus, the Court
applied only some of the general rules used to interpret such matters: intent of the
declarant and good faith.
Observing that a state's consent to adjudicate forms the foundation of the
optional clause system, the Court reiterated the importance of interpreting an indi-
vidual declaration by first seeking evidence of the intention of the declarant at the time
of making the declaration. 133
It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts ... may have
the effect of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are,
very specific. When it is the intention of the State making the declaration that it should
128. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 59, 63; see Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), 1961
I.C.J. 17, 32-33 (Preliminary Objections, Judgment of May 26); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93,
105 (Jurisdiction, Judgment of July 22).
129. The P.C.I.J. discussed the legal nature of optional clause declarations principally in two cases, Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belg. v. Bulg.), 1939 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 77, at 81 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment
of Apr. 4) (declarations result in contractual obligations) and Phosphates in Morocco (Italy v. Fr.), 1938 P.C.I.J., ser.
A/B, No. 74, at 22 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of June 14) (declarations are unilateral acts). See R.P. Aixano, supra
note 5, at 142-47; Fachiri, Repudiation of the Optional Clause, 20 Brt. Y.B. INr'L . 52, 56 (1939).
130. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 418
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
131. Id.
132. Memorial of United States, supra note 48, at 209.
133. The Nicaraguan Memorial urged this approach. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 63. Although the Court
generally applied the treaty principle of "natural and ordinary" meaning to the interpretation of the Iranian declaration
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93, 104 (Judgment of July 22), the Court "seems to have
felt that the voluntary and unilateral character of these declarations put them in a special position, in which it was necessary
to have particular regard to the known, apparent or probable intentions of the State making the declaration ....
Fitzmaurice, supra note 17, at 77.
PRE-SEISIN RECIPROCITY
become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the
character of a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a
course of conduct consistent with the declaration.'14
1. United States Intent
Declarations of acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction are faculta-
tive, unilateral engagements, that states are absolutely free to make unconditionally
and without limit of time for its duration, or to qualify with reservations or conditions
specifying how long the declaration shall remain in force, or what notice, if any, will
be required to terminate it. 135 The United States declaration makes no provision for
variation or modification but does provide in clear terms for termination on expiration
of six months notice of termination. 136 The circumstances under which the United
States Senate gave its advice and consent to the 1946 declaration reveal that the
United States did not intend to reserve a power of modification or variation. The
Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the pertinent Senate
Resolution described the declaration as:
[A] unilateral declaration having the force and effect of a treaty as between the United States
and each of the other states which accept the same obligations .... While the declaration
can hardly be considered a treaty in the strict sense of that term, the nature of the
obligations assumed by the contracting parties are such that no action less solemn or less
formal than that required for treaties should be contemplated. 3 7
The Report of the Senate Committee recommending approval of the advice and
consent resolution reveals that a scenario similar to that created by the 1984
notification was envisioned by the Committee and specifically provided for:
The resolution provides that the declaration should remain in force for a period of 5
years and thereafter until 6 months following notice of termination. The declaration might,
therefore, remain in force indefinitely. The provision for 6 months' notice of termination
after the 5-year period has the effect of a renunciation of any intention to withdraw our
obligation in the face of a threatened legal proceeding.'38
Two points highlight the bad faith in international obligations and disregard of
unilateral commitment implicit in the United States April 6, 1984, notification. First,
the text of the notification "implicitly recognizes the incompatibility of the concept
of modification with the terms of the United States declaration when it employs the
phrase 'notwithstanding the terms of the aforesaid Declaration." '" 139 This clause
certainly alludes to the following clause in the 1946 declaration: "This declaration
134. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253,267, 472 (Judgment of Dec. 20), cited with approval in Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 418 (Jurisdiction and Admissi-
bility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 418
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
136. See supra note 3.
137. Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, S. Doc. No. 259, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1946).
138. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
139. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 65.
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shall remain in force ... until the expiration of six months after notice may be given
to terminate this declaration." ' 4 Second, it also appears from the April 6 letter that
the very purpose of the attempted modification was "to withdraw [the U.S.]
obligation in the face of a threatened legal proceeding" and to avoid the possibility
that the issues presented in Nicaragua's application be subject to judicial scrutiny.1 4 '
The April 6, 1984, notification is clearly incompatible with the expression of
consent embodied in the United States 1946 declaration. Ironically, the Court
adopted policy considerations urged by the United States: that compulsory jurisdic-
tion, being a major obligation, must be based on the clearest manifestation of the
state's intent to accept it. 142
2. Good Faith in Consensual Legal Relations
To say that states should be bound by their declarations does not mandate the
conclusion that declarations "are subject to specially exacting and restrictive inter-
pretation." '1 43 As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht says:
[T] here is a distinct measure of exaggeration in the view that the undertaking of commitments
of obligatory judicial settlement implies a one-sided abandonment of sovereign rights.
What is true is that the undertaking must be the result of the intention--express or
implied-of the parties and that such intention must, and can, be proved in the same way
as any other obligation undertaken in a treaty or an instrument equivalent thereto.ta4
In determining the manner and extent to which the United States would be bound
to adjudicate, the Court advanced beyond examination of the declarant's own
interpretation to consider what other states accepting the same obligation of compul-
sory jurisdiction may believe regarding the legal situation of the United States. In so
doing, the Court upheld the importance of good faith in international relations,
derived from the principle of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties.14 5
By incorporating this modified general principle of treaty interpretation, the
Court refrained from granting a purely restrictive interpretation to the unilateral
declaration of the United States. Instead of attaching "decisive importance to the
meaning given to a unilateral declaration of acceptance by the party making it as
distinguished from its legal effect as determined by ordinary methods of interpreta-
tion,"1 46 the Court adopted "[o]ne of the basic principles governing the creation and
performance of legal obligations. . . the principle of good faith .. . .",47 Conse-
quently, interested states may place confidence in unilateral declarations and are
entitled to require that the obligation thus created be respected.
140. See supra note 3.
141. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 66.
142. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 411
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26). The United States was not heard to complain when the Court made
the identical finding unanimously denouncing Iran's actions in the hostage-crisis case.
143. H. LAurERPAcHT, supra note 16, at 339.
144. Id. at 338-39.
145. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268, 473 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
146. H. LA tERPACHT, supra note 16, at 344.
147. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 268, 473 (Judgment of Dec. 20).
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PRE-SEISIN RECIPROCITY
The majority 148 successfully averted further erosion in the integrity and credi-
bility afforded to unilaterally assumed international obligations. By attaching a
binding legal character to the obligations of declarant states vis-a-vis each other, the
Court agrees with commentators Waldock and Lauterpacht that
The Optional Clause of Article 36(2) of the Statute is actually and potentially the most
important source of the jurisdiction of the Court and caution would seem to be indicated
lest it be reduced to a purely unilateral undertaking which is subject to a restrictive
interpretation divorced from the generally accepted canons of construction. 149
IV. RECIPROCITY AND TEMPORAL LIMITATIONS
Having denied the existence of an inherent right to modify declarations in any
manner and at any time prior to the filing of an application, the Court considered the
interrelationship between unilaterally appended time limits and the doctrine of reci-
procity. The issue was not simply whether a declaration is subject to modification
before an application is filed. Rather, the question was whether reciprocity enables
states to modify the scope of their acceptance prior to the filing of an application, in
a manner inconsistent with the terms of their own declaration, by relying on the terms
of a potential adversary's declaration. The United States argued that Nicaragua was
not a "state accepting the same obligation," in an attempt to invoke the "novel
application to relations even before seisin of the principle of reciprocity." 5 0
The United States relied on two underlying premises. First, Nicaragua's uncon-
ditional declaration was indefinite in duration, as opposed to unlimited.' 5' Second,
because the United States accepted a less flexible obligation, it could therefore invoke
Nicaragua's purported right to immediate termination pursuant to the doctrine of
reciprocity. In the oral hearings on provisional measures the Deputy Agent of the
United States expressed the argument in these words:
Under the principle of reciprocity, the United States could only be bound by its
six-month notice proviso in relation to Nicaragua if Nicaragua had a similar or greater
notice period in its declaration .... Nicaragua's declaration... is wider ratione ma-
teriae, but narrower ratione temporis, than the United States declaration. As the State
making the wider temporal acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction, the United States was
therefore also entitled to rely on Nicaragua's purported declaration to modify its own
declaration with immediate effect.152
148. Every one of the Court's judges except the American judge, Schwebel, found some basis for jurisdiction.
"Among them were distinguished jurists from Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Brazil and Argentina, none
of whom can by any stretch of the imagination be regarded as politically biased against [the U.S.]." Gardner, It Was
Wrong to Duck the World Court, Wall St. J., Feb. 22, 1985, at 26, cols. 4-5.
149. H. LIt:rEpAcr, supra note 16, at 346.
150. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 548
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26) (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.).
151. The U.S. alleges that an "indefinite" unilateral commitment may be terminated immediately, as opposed to one
which is subject to a fixed period of validity and then either becomes immediately terminable or remains subject to a notice
period for termination (as did the U.S. declaration). Under this definition, the U.S. declaration of 1946 became
"indefinite" in 1951 subject to the six-month notice period. The declaration of Nicaragua, which contains no time limit,
is likewise termed "indefinite," subject to no period of notice.
152. CR 84110, pp. 71-72.
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According to the United States contention, the principle of mutuality and
equality of states before the Court permitted the United States to exercise the
reciprocal right of termination with immediate effect implicitly enjoyed by Nicaragua
even before Nicaragua filed its application. 153
Nicaragua refuted both arguments, asserting primarily that reciprocity simply
does not apply to time limits set by states for the duration and termination of their
declarations.1 54 Nigaragua claimed secondly that even if reciprocal rights attached to
the procedural terms and formal conditions of consensual legal obligations, the United
States in this case was left with the narrower acceptance, because Nicaragua's
unconditional declaration remains in force in perpetuity. 155 In a clear affirmation of
the former argument, the Court found Nicaragua to be a state "accepting the same
obligation" for purposes of Article 36, paragraph 2, and entitled to rely on the integral
six month notice proviso. The notion of reciprocity is concerned with the scope and
substance of the commitments entered into, including reservations, and not with the
formal conditions of their creation, duration or extinction. It appears clearly that
reciprocity cannot be invoked in order to excuse departure from the terms of a state's
own declaration, whatever its scope, limitations or conditions.' 56
In resolving these conflicting conceptual interpretations, the Court made several
bold and clarifying advances regarding the interpretation of declarations and simul-
taneously laid the groundwork for potentially troubling future developments in the
application of reciprocity to temporal limitations.
A. Two Kinds of Time Limits
The Court made a clarifying distinction between the substantive limitations and
conditions on the scope of a state's acceptance of jurisdiction as contained in the
reservations, and those portions of declarations which comprise the structure of the
instrument itself.' 57 The former fall within the purview of the reciprocity doctrine,
whereas it is now affimned that reciprocity cannot be invoked to excuse departure
from the formal, procedural conditions of duration and extinction which form an
integral part of the instrument of acceptance.' 58 Regardless of the possible interpre-
tations of the terminability of an unconditional declaration, the Court ruled that the
United States could not invoke reciprocity as the basis for its 1984 notification, which
153. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 416-17
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
154. Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 77.
155. Id. at 75.
156. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
The regime of reciprocity is maintained, however, since any substantive reservations introduced by [a State] in
the exercise of its reserved right to vary could be taken advantage of in the ordinary way by the other State. It
is the substantive content of the declaration at any particular time that is the subject of the regime of reciprocity,
and not the right to vary itself.
Memorial of Nicaragua, supra note 7, at 78.
157. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419




purported to modify the substance of the 1946 declaration.15 9 The Court said
Nicaragua was entitled to rely on the maintenance in force of the United States
declaration for six months after notification of termination, that proviso being a
positive undertaking and an integral part of the instrument which contains it. 160
In its analysis, the Court failed to resolve satisfactorily whether formal condi-
tions reserving a right to modify may, under certain circumstances, come within the
operative effect of reciprocity; in so doing, the Court raised a very troubling issue.
The problem arises from a failure to denounce categorically the application of
reciprocity to any type of temporal limitation.
B. The Interpretation of Unconditional Declarations
The Court could have concluded its analysis of the legal ineffectiveness of the
1984 notification once it defined the six month notice proviso as an undertaking
integral to the United States declaration and outside the scope of reciprocity. At that
point it was clear that the United States was not entitled to act in non-application of
the 1946 time limit proviso. The Court, however, went on in an attempt to discern the
terminability of unconditional declarations.
The United States insisted that because Nicaragua's declaration is silent on the
issue of termination, the declaration is indefinite and immediately terminable. 61
Commentators have debated strenuously the right of immediate termination of
declarations of indefinite duration. 162
In support of Nicaragua's position that declarations such as theirs remain forever
valid, several scholars have promoted the application of rules of treaty interpretation.
McNair' 63 and Brierly 64 assert that there is no general right of unilateral termination
of a treaty of indefinite duration. According to Articles 42-46 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties, 165 the termination of a treaty that has no express
reservation of a right of denunciation must rest upon some supervening legal title
recognized in international law. 66 Anand' 67 supports the analogy to treaty law and
observes:
There being no provision in the Statute, it seems reasonable to assume that the abrogation
or expiry of the declaration will be subject to the general rules covering termination of
treaties. This would normally mean that a State having made a declaration without any
provision for its termination would not be entitled to cancel it as against other states having
declarations for fixed periods except with their consent. Otherwise, termination ...
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 419; Memorial of United States, supra note 48, at 252.
162. See R.P. ANAN-a, supra note 5, at 159-60; I. SNiHATA, THE POWER Or IM Im.RNATioNAL Corm To DENREI Irs
OwN Jumso cnoN 149-50 (1965); Briggs, Reservations to the Acceptance of Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice, 93 REcuEM. DEs Cous 223, 240-42 (19581); Waldock, supra note 27, at 255; Williams, The Optional
Clause, 11 Burr. Y.B. IN'L L. 63-84 (1930).
163. A. McNAm, THE LAw OF TREAims 493-505 (1961).
164. D. Bjuu.'y, LAw OF NAmoss 240 (1949).
165. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969).
166. Capotorti, L'Extinction et la suspension des Traitis, 134 RectCUE. DES CoURS 427-581 (1971).
167. R.P. ANAs, supra note 5, at 177.
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would not be justifiable except by reference to some special rule concerning the termi-
nation of treaties .... 165
In opposition, Rosenne cites the "unreality" of applying to the few remaining
declarations "an inflexible rule said to derive from the general law of treaties and
disallowing the right of unilateral withdrawal." 169
The Court dealt with this issue cursorily, applying by analogy the good faith
principle derived from the law of treaties. 170 The Court interpreted this principle as
requiring a reasonable time for termination of or withdrawal from treaties containing
no provision for the duration of their validity. 17' Having set the standard at a
"reasonable time," the Court concluded that even if reciprocity did apply to time
limits, the United States failed to properly abide by the durational provisions
contained in Nicaragua's declaration. 172 Apparently, the three days from April 6 (date
of notification) to April 9, 1984 (date of filing) was not a reasonable time. 173
The Court entertained a disturbing notion when it considered the possibility that
under certain circumstances reciprocity might be relied upon to avoid the unilaterally
appended terms of one's own declaration. For example, had Nicaragua's declaration
limited the scope of its acceptance by reserving a right of termination with immediate
effect, could the United States have invoked that reservation, prior to the filing of the
application, to avoid both the jurisdiction of the Court and the terms of its own
acceptance? The majority sentiment indicated dissatisfaction with such a possibility.
In the words of the majority:
168. Id. at 177; see also Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the International
Court of Justice, 68 Ast. J. INT'L L. 51-68 (1974); Briggs, supra note 162, at 272-73; M. Wuraw, 14 DGEsr OF
INERNATIONAL U W 410, 425-31, 441 (M. Whiteman ed. 1970).
169. S. Rosetat, THE TmsE FACTOR 27 (1960); I. StIHATA, supra note 162, at 167. Judge Oda similarly felt that "'it
is quite untenable to argue that those declarations without any reference to duration . . . can never be terminated or
amended because of the lack of a clause concerning the period of validity of declarations." Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 510 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of
Nov. 26) (Oda, J., Sep. Opin.).
170. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419-20
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26). Judge Mosler rejected the notion, urged by the United States, of
immediate terminability of unconditional declarations and agreed instead with the Court's application by analogy of the
treaty principle of good faith. Id. at 466-67 (Mosler, J., Sep. Opin.). Judge Oda, on the other hand, rejected the limited
analogy to treaty principles of interpretation since the analogy cannot be uniformly applied to other aspects of optional
clause declarations. After a thorough examination of history and state practice under the optional clause regime, Oda found
Nicaragua's declaration to be terminable on notice. Id. at 510 (Oda, J., Sep. Opin.). Judge Jennings found the entire
discussion of whether the legal position of declarations is governed by treaty law to be inconclusive.
The fact of the matter must surely be that the Optional Clause regime is sui generis. Doubtless some parts of
the law of treaties may be applied by useful analogy; but so may the law governing unilateral declarations; and
so .. .may the law deriving from the practice of States in respect of such declarations.
Id. at 546 (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.); see also id. at 620-21 (Schwebel, J., Sep. Opin.) (declarations are unilateral
instruments subject to a sui generis regime).
171. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419-20
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26). Judge Mosler concluded that "all legally binding acts . ..can,
under certain conditions, be terminated. . . . The questions remain however on what conditions the right of termination
may be exercised." Id. at 466-67 (Mosler, J., Sep. Opin.). Judges Jennings, Oda, and Schwebel interpreted Nicaragua's
unconditional declaration as immediately terminable in light of state practice.
172. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 419-20
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
173. Id.
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The Court is not convinced that it would be appropriate, or possible, to try to determine
whether a State against which proceedings had not yet been instituted could rely on a
provision in another State's declaration to terminate or modify its obligations before the
Court was seised .... [The] jurisprudence [of the Court] supports the view that a
determination of the existence of the "same obligation" requires the presence of two
parties to a case, and a defined issue between them, which conditions can only be satisfied
when proceedings have been instituted. 74
This issue merits immediate attention in view of the large number of declarations
that reserve a right of immediate terminability on notice to the Secretary-General.1 7 5
Under the well-accepted Nottebohm rule, once proceedings have been properly
instituted the seisin of the Court may not be affected by subsequent changes,
amendments, or denunciations of a declaration.' 76 Thus, if the Court had denounced
categorically pre-seisin reciprocity, the ultimate conclusion would be that no type of
temporal reservation could be invoked under the doctrine of reciprocity to effect a
substantive alteration of a declaration in a manner inconsistent with the terms of that
instrument. Regrettably, the majority did not use this occasion to that end, and four
of the separate opinions took the opportunity to expand on the potential future
recognition of a right of pre-seisin reciprocity.
This is the view adopted by Judge Mosler177 who considers temporal limitations
of any sort to be substantive reservations for the purpose of reciprocity.
Reservations restrict the substantive extent of the obligation, time-limits put an end to the
obligation, whether made with or without substantive limitations in its entirety. It is
difficult to see how the 'same obligation' within the meaning of Article 36, paragraph 2,
can continue to exist longer for one State than for its potential counterpart whose
declaration is limited by a shorter notice period, or may be terminated by notification at
any moment.178
A conceptual problem inherent in this reasoning is recognized by all those who
advocate it; no state has a right or a need to invoke reciprocity until an application is
filed, and at that point the consideration of amending or terminating with respect to
the current dispute becomes entirely academic. Therefore, to persist in the argument
for full equality of obligation at all times is to sanction pre-seisin reciprocity, a
concept which flies in the face of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction.
C. Pre-Seisin Reciprocity
Pre-seisin reciprocity challenges the very concept of an effective adjudicative
system intent upon promoting peaceful settlement of disputes in the international
174. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 420
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26).
175. Waldock, supra note 27, at 278; see supra note 102.
176. Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111, 123 (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of Nov. 18); see
supra text accompanying notes 56-57, 114-17.
177. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 461
(Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Nov. 26) (Mosler, J., Sep. Opin.).
178. Id. at 466.
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sphere. Such a concept would encourage premature filing of applications, substantive
modification of binding commitments vis-a-vis certain states based on the speculation
that those states may attempt to bring their dispute to Court, anxious withdrawal and
apprehensive substitution of severely limited declarations, and overall confusion due
to the inability to rely on a single version of a state's commitment binding erga
omnes.
The separate opinions of Judges Mosler, Oda and Jennings, depend on the
circumstances of this particular case for their analysis of the reciprocity issue. Their
opinions merit scrutiny in light of the likelihood of a future situation arising under a
less restrictive set of facts.
Judge Mosler found Nicaragua's unconditional declaration to be terminable on
reasonable notice and on the facts of this case concluded that the United States
six-month notice provision simply could not be reduced to three days. Therefore, the
United States was not in a position on April 6, 1984, to benefit from reciprocal
reliance on the shorter notice period attributed to Nicaragua. 179
Judge Mosler's opinion supports the inference that had Nicaragua's declaration
been explicitly terminable on notice, the United States could have reciprocally relied
on that provision to terminate its own obligation, in disregard of the six-month notice
provision and prior to the filing of an application by Nicaragua.
In that situation, the only way for a state with an immediately terminable
declaration to achieve peaceful adjudication on the merits of its claim would be to file
without warning and probably prematurely. The possiblity of state A effecting
substantive changes in its own declaration in avoidance of its terms, in reciprocal
reliance on the procedural reservations contained in the declaration of state B, exists
only until an application has been filed and the Court has become seised of the
dispute. State B must manage to file an application before the defendant state A has
made use of B's shorter notice period to effectively terminate or modify the scope of
its declaration. 180
Judge Oda conducted a comprehensive survey of past practice under the optional
clause and concluded that a declaration with no fixed period of duration should be
interpreted as terminable at any time. Therefore, because the United States has
assumed the weightier manner and notice provision, it should be entitled to invoke the
doctrine of reciprocity prior to seisin to equalize the commitments of the Applicant
and Respondent state. 18' Nicaragua cannot equitably insist upon United States
compliance with a burden of inescapability which Nicaragua itself does not bear.' 82
Oda stated:
The reciprocity of the obligation must exist at the date of the seisin of the case, and
acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction by the Applicant and the Respondent must be current
179. Id.
180. Id.




at that date .... Thus the United States is fully exempted from the Court's jurisdiction
in relation to Nicaragua on the date of Nicaragua's application. 83
It appears from this statement that Judge Oda was induced to advocate reliance
on the doctrine of reciprocity as a means of justifying the alteration of a state's
consensual commitments prior to seisin in disregard of their own structural reserva-
tions.
Judge Jennings viewed state practice as establishing an unmistakable trend in the
attitudes and expectations of states within the optional clause system. Jennings
concluded that states now "have the right, before seisin of the Court, to withdraw or
alter their declarations of acceptance, with immediate effect, and, moreover, even in
anticipation of a particular case or class of cases." ' 184
Thus, pre-seisin reciprocity is advanced as a superfluous justification for the
result urged by the United States. Even if a period of notice of termination were
imputed to Nicaragua's declaration, Jennings suggested that notice with immediate
effect is, in fact, reasonable notice. 185
Judge Schwebel found temporal conditions to be within the reach of reciprocity
on four grounds. Initially, he viewed temporal conditions as no less integral to the
concepts of mutuality and sovereignty of states before the Court than are substantive
reservations. 186 Secondly, he found no definitive statements by the Court precluding
such an application of reciprocity. Perhaps this finding is not surprising since never
before has a state attempted to avoid the "revision" terms of its own declaration in
stated reliance on the "revision" terms contained in the declaration of another state.
Thirdly, Schwebel argued that the United States intended, at the time the 1946
declaration was drafted, that the safeguard of reciprocity would apply to temporal
reservations. 187 Last, he asserted that a contrary result may produce inequality and
inequity. 188 To the contrary, if the practice of states in disregard of their commitments
has truly become an established and accepted right, and if the trend among declarant
states has been to condition their declarations on a right of immediate termination,
surely the United States has had ample opportunity in the past thirty-nine years to
incorporate such a right into the 1946 declaration, in the manner prescribed therein.
None of the Judges advocating pre-seisin reciprocity deny the complexity and
confusion such a concept would infuse into the optional clause system. Judge Mosler
acknowledges the "disadvantages" that would result from the relative effect of
declarations in a regime which sanctions complete reciprocity; however, he does not
foresee greater complications than currently exist with respect to substantive reser-
vations. 89
Judge Schwebel expanded on the foreseeable chaos when he acknowledged that
taking such a
183. Id.
184. Id. at 553 (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 624 (Schwebel, J., Sep. Opin.).
187. Id. at 626.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 466 (Mosler, J., Sep. Opin.).
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broad view of reciprocity, which would not give effect to the 1984 notification of the
United States erga omnes, but would regard the United States as having been empowered
reciprocally and immediately to terminate its declaration vis-a-vis Nicaragua, involves a
construction of reciprocity which, being applied before a case is filed in the Court, gives
rise to complications.190
Judge Oda does not attempt to minimize the negative implications of his
analysis, which he views in terms of the optimistic, unrealistic goals embodied in the
optional clause system. 191 Unfortunately, Oda's sentiments purport recognition of
"the reality of the international community-where a lack of confidence in interna-
tional law still prevails and the law enforcement machinery is still non-
existent .... ",192
By far the most disheartening is the opinion of Judge Jennings who, like Judge
Oda, bases his favorable evaluation of pre-seisin reciprocity on state practice and
harshly concludes:
[A]ttractive as the device of reciprocity might be for solving this problem, the fact is that
the practice of States ... has already gone beyond it .... States belonging to the
Optional Clause system have now generally the expectation that they can lawfully
withdraw or alter their declarations of acceptance at will, provided only that this is done
before seisin.193
This Note does not argue that the substance of the reservations sought to be
appended to the United States declaration via the 1984 notification are impermissible
or even that the United States had no right to attempt modification in the face of
threatened legal proceedings. This Note's rejection of pre-seisin reciprocity and the
denunciation of an inherent right to modify at any time prior to seisin represents an
expectation that integrity and good faith should be inseparable from the unilateral
obligations undertaken by any sovereign state.
V. CONCLUSION
Because no substantive changes in the scope of a declaration will affect the seisin
of the Court after an application has been filed, the only time one state's broader right
to modify its obligation is a valid concern is prior to the moment of seisin. However,
the reciprocal right to equalize the scope of the obligation accepted in relation to a
given dispute arises only when an application has been filed. Prior to the filing of an
application, a state is bound to the integral terms of its own instrument of acceptance.
The binding character of declarations arises from the principle of good faith in
international relations and is defined by the intent of the declarant state at the time the
declaration was filed. A government can limit its internal liability by terminating its
acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction or by adding a reservation in
accordance with the manner and notice provisions it has prescribed for itself.
190. Id. at 627 (Schwebel, I., Sep. Opin.).
191. Id. at 512 (Oda, J., Sep. Opin.).
192. Id.
193. Id. at 550 (Jennings, J., Sep. Opin.).
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PRE-SEISIN RECIPROCITY
However, if by design or inadvertence a state fails to do so, it cannot then seek to rely
on the procedural devices incorporated in another state's declaration.1 94 Yet, several
judges have argued that as a matter of political reality, acceptance of compulsory
jurisdiction may depend upon the freedom afforded the sovereign subjects of inter-
national law to limit the scope of their acceptance. This view has led judges and
commentators to promote the concept of pre-seisin reciprocity.
The concept of pre-seisin reciprocity was held to be inoperative under the
unusual facts of the Nicaragua v. United States case, but a more amenable fact pattern
is not difficult to foresee. Once condoned, pre-seisin reciprocity will induce states to
guess the identity of a potential opponent and to invoke the terms of that state's
declaration (if necessary) to make substantive changes in their own acceptance. Such
changes would only be effective vis-a-vis the state whose terms were utilized to effect
the revisions. After several such revisions in the scope and substance of one state's
commitment, the level of uncertainty would be so high within the optional clause
system that no state could be relied upon to wade through the tangle of declarations
to arrive at a clear analysis of its own right to institute peaceful adjudication.
Possibly, fewer states will be tempted to adhere to the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction in light of a decision upholding the integrity of unilateral obligations and
refusing to legitimize state practice which evidences blatant disregard for organized
international justice.' 95 Current adherents might now be induced to make their
declarations immediately terminable.' 96 However, to judicially endorse pre-seisin
reciprocity is to reduce optional clause jurisdiction to a system so malleable as to
permit states complete freedom to determine their adherence to international law on
a case by case basis, in which case the Court might as well end the pretense of a
compulsory jurisdiction system and hold itself out merely as a forum for negotiations
between currently amenable parties.197
Ilene R. Cohn
194. Gardner, supra note 148.
195. Some have urged the United States to reconsider its acceptance of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Former
State Department legal advisor John R. Stevenson feels that this case "will be viewed by many as a highly technical and
inequitable expansion of the Court's jurisdiction against the expressly stated wishes of the defendant . . . and will result
in less rather than more use of the Court." Stevenson, On World Court's Compulsory Jurisdiction Over U.S., N.Y. Times,
Feb. 9, 1985, at 16, col. 3.
196. In his separate opinion, Judge Oda stated that:
[T]he present Judgment will inevitably induce declarant States to terminate their declarations or at least drop
from them any advance notice clause, so as to avoid having to answer any case unilaterally brought by other
States, which themselves can take advantage of withdrawing at any time from their obligations under the Court's
jurisdiction. This would vastly diminish the importance of the Optional Clause.
Military and Paramilitary in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392, 513 (Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment of Nov. 26) (Oda, J., Sep. Opin.).
197. In accordance with the instructions of the President, on October 7, the Secretary of State deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations formal notice of termination of the United States declaration,
deposited on August 26, 1946, accepting the optional compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice. This action will become effective six months after the deposit of that notice.
Statement by The Deputy Spokesman for the Department of State on the United States Decision on the International
Court of Justice.
See U.S. Plans to Quit the World Court in Political Cases, N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
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